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I. INTRODUCTION 
Criminal procedure scholarship would not seem to qualify as a literary art 
form, but in recent years it has generated a kind of literary genre: the 
Reassessment of the Great Case, usually on some round-number anniversary. 
Three of the most common subjects for this exercise have been Gideon v. 
Wainwright,1 Mapp v. Ohio,2 and Miranda v. Arizona3, and for those we can 
 
*  Robert Weisberg, Edwin E. Huddleson, Jr. Professor of Law at Stanford; founder and Co-Faculty 
Director of the Stanford Criminal Justice Center. It has always been an honor to be a guest at the McGeorge 
Law School, where Professor Vitiello and his colleagues and students have always helped to enrich legal 
scholarship. 
1.  372 U.S. 335 (1983) (Sixth Amendment right of counsel in serious criminal cases). See, e.g., 
Symposium: The Gideon Effect: Rights, Justice, and Lawyers Fifty Years After Gideon v. Wainwright, 122 
YALE L.J. 2106 (2013). 
2.  367 U.S. 643 (1961) (exclusionary rule for Fourth Amendment violations applies to the states); see, 
e.g., Symposium on The Fortieth Anniversary of Mapp v. Ohio, 52 WESTERN RES. L. REV. 371 (1997). 
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identify some key elements of this literary genre. Most of the scholarship 
favorably recalls these cases as announcing big broad declarations of the rights of 
suspects or defendants4 and proceeds to a sober consideration of the current state 
of those protections and often a distressed lament for how later Court decisions 
have weakened them.5 The fourth case that has been subject to the anniversary 
reassessment is Terry v. Ohio,6 and here, the genre takes a very different form. 
Most obviously, in Terry the defendant lost. But also, as discussed below, in his 
majority opinion Chief Justice Warren produced a somewhat tortured 
compromise about how to balance police power against people’s privacy and 
liberty, so that the theme of many Terry reassessments is not unfulfilled or 
thwarted promise so much as tragic lament that we continue to suffer from its 
defects. Indeed, for many, any appearance of elegant compromise in Terry is an 
illusion masking Warren’s craven surrender to law enforcement. 
But as a subject of reassessment Terry has still another distinction: Gideon, 
Mapp, and Miranda are important for what they clearly, if controversially, did. In 
none of the cases were the underlying facts terribly important,7 nor did the 
language of the majority opinions contain problematic ambiguities.8 Not so for 
Terry. 
As a starting point, can we at least stipulate to Terry’s holding? In a 
ridiculously simplified nutshell, Terry holds that if a police officer’s observations 
of an individual induces in the officer’s experienced mind a reasonable suspicion 
 
3.  384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (suspects interrogated in custody must be warned of Fifth Amendment 
rights). See e.g., Symposium, Miranda at 40, 10 CHAPMAN CHAP. L. REV. 531 (2007). 
4.  I am focusing here on academic scholarship, which in the American law schools academy tends to the 
liberal side. While Gideon was not so controversial, obviously Mapp and Miranda were denounced and are still 
criticized by entrenched law enforcement officials and tough-on-crime political voices, and Miranda has been 
subject to a very vigorous line of empirical scholarship criticizing it for undermining law enforcement and 
worsening crimecrim. E.g., Paul Cassell, Still Handcuffing the Cops? A Review of Fifty Years of Empirical 
Evidence of Miranda’s Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 97 B.U. L. REV. 685 (2017).  
5.  For the relatively iconic Gideon the distress in the typical reassessment concerns the failure of our 
overall system of justice to deliver on the case’s promises because of the lack of funding, see Mary Sue Backus 
& Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, a National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1039 
(2006). For the case’s incomplete coverage of misdemeanors, see Alexandra Natapoff, Gideon Skepticism, 70 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1049, 1070 (2013).  
For Mapp, the typical reassessment criticizes or denounces the later limitations on the exclusionary rule, such as 
through the good-faith exception, although Some commentators quite sympathetic to the overall Warren Court 
revolution do argue that as practical matter the rule has been counter-productive. See Christopher Slobogin, 
Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 1999 ILL. L. REV. 363, 364–65 (1999). As for Miranda, 
beyond the empirical critique noted above, commentators favorably disposed to the case criticize the Miranda 
warning as an insufficient form of protection. E.g., Welsh S. White, Miranda’s Failure to Restrain Pernicious 
Interrogation Practices, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1211 (2001). 
6.  392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
7.  The facts in Mapp are famously colorful, see Yale Kamisar, Mapp v. Ohio: The First Shot Fired in the 
Warren Court’s Criminal Procedure “Revolution,” in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 45, 47–48 (Carol Steiker 
ed., 2006), but the point of the case was blunt: an illegal search that would have led to exclusion of evidence in 
a federal case does so in a state case. The only key fact in Miranda is that the suspect was not given the 
warning. 
8.  Of course Miranda created uncertainties about doctrinal issues the Court left open (e.g., what is 
custody?; what is a true waiver?), see White, supra note 5, but the language of the holding itself is pretty 
straightforward. 
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that the person is engaging in or about to commit a crime, the officer may detain 
the person for a brief period to investigate (and can then arrest the person if the 
suspicion turns into probable cause). Then, if during this investigative stop the 
officer has reason to think the person might pose physical harm, the officer can 
“frisk”—i.e., do a “patdown” of the person’s outer clothing, and if the officer 
infers a reasonable chance of a concealed weapon, the officer can then reach 
farther in to retrieve it.9 These actions are indeed regulated by the Fourth 
Amendment, but they do not require a warrant or probable cause, and if the Terry 
rules are followed, the police of course can use any resulting evidence against the 
person. And, the case held all this on the basis of a deceptively simple—and now 
famous—set of facts. The very experienced Officer McFadden saw Terry and 
two other men walking back and forth along some store fronts, suspected that a 
robbery was afoot, confronted them, asked their names, got an unclear response, 
frisked Terry for a weapon, and found a gun that then established probable cause 
for arrest for illegal possession.10 
But, on Terry anniversaries over the last half a century, the reassessors of 
Terry still ponder the fine details and ambiguities of the facts of the case and the 
vexing and often frustrating linguistic details of the way Warren renders them in 
the opinion. Here are just a few examples. Warren retells McFadden’s narrative 
of events in deceptive detail, ostensibly recreating McFadden’s visual 
observations second by second and yet implicitly emphasizing the gaps in the 
officer’s narrative. As a result, in academic recounting of Warren’s recounting of 
McFadden’s recounting, debates continue about how many times Terry and his 
accomplices walked back and forth; whether they might have been on the verge 
of abandoning their plans; what type of store they were checking out; and what, 
if anything, to make of McFadden’s statement that Terry “mumbled something” 
to him.11 And, as a doctrinal matter, (as will be discussed more below), we still 
debate at what point, in the Court’s view, McFadden crossed the Fourth 
Amendment line and “seized” Terry, and, if the crossing occurred early in the 
encounter, whether McFadden had any objectively suspicious facts or was just 
relying on his intuition that “they didn’t look right to me at the time.”12 
Notably, the factual and doctrinal uncertainties are reflected in some odd 
tonalities in the opinion. At key points Warren sounds either ambivalent or 
cynically sarcastic about his own holding, such as when he refers to “the power 
of the police to ‘stop and frisk’—as it is sometimes euphemistically termed—
suspicious persons.” Was Warren writing in a tone of subtle nuance, or did he 
(ironically) “mumble” evasively, in neurotic anxiety? 
These odd details are markers of the vexing questions raised in many of the 
 
9.  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). 
10.  Id. at 6, 7. 
11.  E.g., Lewis B. Katz, Terry v. Ohio At Thirty-Five: A Revisionist View, 74 MISS. L.J. 423, 434–35 
(2004). 
12.  Terry, 392 U.S. at 5. 
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Terry reassessments. Did Terry save the populace from a potentially lawless 
police practice by at least somewhat subjecting the stop-and-frisk tactic to the 
Fourth Amendment? Or, did Terry start and signal the end of a robust application 
of the warrant and probable cause requirement? But, more specifically, did Terry 
grant the police the crucial power to stop/detain without ever pausing to define 
the scope and basis of that power? Did Terry place any meaningful restrictions 
on the power of the police to frisk when they legally do a stop? 
These last two questions arise in part because of the oft-noted dissonance 
between Warren’s opinion and the Harlan concurrence.13 Harlan either clarifies 
or corrects Warren14 on the crucial point that the power to frisk does not even 
arise until there is a legal stop.15 And, Harlan either clarifies or disagrees with 
Warren on whether the power to frisk is ‘automatic” once there is a legal stop.16 
While, as I will show below, various interpreters of Terry at various times since 
1968 have purported to draw clear answers to these questions, dissatisfaction by 
and disagreements among the “anniversary reassessors” and very recent legal 
developments show that the answers are unsettled or in flux. In effect, the key 
gaps in the Warren opinion, and the disjointed relationship between the Warren 
and Harlan’s opinion, represent the “original sin” of Terry, a sin that has not yet 
been redeemed. 
In this Essay I have two goals. First, I will “reassess the reassessments,” 
drawing on some of the most useful and representative anniversary commentaries 
on Terry to give an updated sense of how Terry still haunts our criminal justice 
system in light of the questions I have just elaborated.17 Second, I will synthesize 
these continuing perplexities, reframing them into the key questions: What 
exactly does reasonable “suspicion” mean? Does the evocative word “suspicion,” 
suggest a perception of some kind of social malevolence, or is it an unnecessarily 
evocative term meant to stand for a probability assessment—i.e., “reasonable 
cause” as a subset of “probable cause?” If so, how do we now make that 
probability assessment in light of changes in the laws of drugs and guns—the 
subjects of most instances of “reasonable suspicion.” That is, how do we 
reconcile the “procedural” law of stop and frisk with changes in substantive 
criminal law? Then, just what is the operational meaning of the term “armed and 
dangerous?” What does it mean to “investigate” upon a legitimate stop? And, 
 
13.  Id. at 31 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
14.  With deceptive politeness, Harlan says he is “constrained to fill in a few gaps” in the majority 
opinion. Id. 
15.  Id. at 32. 
16.  Id. at 33. 
17.  Of course the scholarship on Terry and the issues emanating from it are voluminous beyond any 
power to inventory, much less review. I am concentrating on the overall “reassessment” as distinct form of 
scholarship. Also, I am looking at Terry issues almost wholly in terms of the visceral encounter of police officer 
and individual. Thus, I am not addressing one of the key emanations from Terry, the extensions of its 
“reasonableness” balancing into the great variety of “administrative searches or “special needs” contexts in 
which the Court has relaxed the requirements of warrant and probable cause, e.g., Michigan Dept. of State 
Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (drunk-driving roadblocks without individualized suspicion); New Jersey v. 
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (searches of public school students on mere reasonable suspicion). 
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how do we tell a stop from an arrest at the moment of seizure or during the 
various stages of a seizure? 
II. EXEMPLARY ASSESSMENTS 
A. The “Standard Model” 
While there are a very many anniversary treatments of Terry, I will choose a 
few telling ones that represent certain rough subcategories. One of the richest 
commentaries is by Professor Lewis R. Katz, and while it is full of original 
insights, it can also stand as what might call the standard model of the Terry 
reassessment—and that means a fairly negative one. For Professor Katz, while 
Terry gave the police a great crime-fighting tool, it “dismally failed” in its 
balancing between law enforcement and privacy.18 First, Terry miserably failed 
at one of the main jobs implicitly entailed by the certiorari grant—to define an 
“investigatory stop.” The result, Processor Katz avers, was that later courts could 
exploit this failure so as to render the Fourth Amendment irrelevant to most on-
the-street police-citizen encounters. While, he notes, the Court recognized that it 
was writing at a crossroads moment of both widespread public fear of crime and 
heightened concerns about racist abuses by police, Terry left judges with a 
paucity of doctrinal resources to alleviate these roiling social tensions.19 
Professor Katz notes that Terry could at least have borrowed from Miranda in 
one sense: It could have written some “prophylactic rules” that could have 
guided both policed and judges and mitigated the risks of arbitrary and racist 
police and judicial decisions.20 What might such rules have looked like? 
Professor Katz does not say, but he does suggest that there might have been 
administrable, if somewhat arbitrary, set of formulas that would have supplied at 
least some leverage for constraint. 
Professor Katz then turns to a very odd (and one might say) gratuitous 
portion of the Terry opinion, Chief Justice Warren’s strange comments on the 
exclusionary rule. Here, Warren admits that legitimating the stop-and frisk has 
the effect of denying suspects like Terry the benefits of Mapp’s exclusionary 
rule. But, he rationalizes this outcome by (perhaps disingenuously) lamenting 
that the rule would do little good anyway to constrain abusive police stops. The 
reason is that a great deal of the time, the police detain people to preemptively 
thwart crime or to control the risk of social disorder without any expectation that 
there will be an adjudication of a crime where suppression of evidence would 
matter.21 For Professor Katz, in what proved to be his penultimate year in the 
Court, and after more than a decade of pathbreaking constitutional expansion, 
 
18.  Katz, supra note 11, at 424. 
19.  Id. 
20.  Id. at 427. 
21.  Terry, 392 U.S. at 13. 
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Warren was abdicating the leadership role the Court had taken on in Mapp and 
Miranda. He was making an “amazing admission of powerlessness from a Court 
that purported to care about the issue.”22 As Professor Katz acerbically put it, 
“Thus, the Court elected not to marshal whatever was left of its moral strength to 
demand that police obey the law while enforcing it.”23 
And, Professor Katz then offers a very sharp insight into the illogic of the 
opinion on this point. He observes that the Court’s remarks about the 
exclusionary rule were based on the erroneous assumption that McFadden’s only 
option was to seize the men. If, as Warren says, the rule is irrelevant in that a 
great number of cases where the police do not foresee arrest or prosecution—that 
is the officer’s goal is to prevent a crime by discouraging or dispersing the 
suspects—McFadden could have scrutinized their behavior by continuing to 
follow them. Thus, says Professor Katz, McFadden could have simply let the 
men know without confronting them that he was a police officer.24 No robbery 
would have been committed on that street at that time, and the suspected crime 
would have been prevented in a far less invasive way. 
Professor Katz concedes that such a suggestion might invite the criticism that 
anything less than a seizure, a search, and ultimately an arrest would have left the 
men armed and free to commit a robbery somewhere else later on.25 But, 
Professor Katz notes, that criticism presumes something that the premise of the 
stop, as approved by Warren cannot support: that McFadden had a very strong 
basis for inferring they were about to commit a robbery, or indeed, at the time of 
the stop they had guns. And, this argument by Professor Katz identifies another 
conceptual problem in Terry. Could McFadden have, in effect, “investigated” the 
men even without seizing them? Or, does “investigation” under Terry mean 
doing something that requires a seizure? And if so, exactly what does post-
seizure “investigation” legally entail? As discussed later,26 questions remain 
about how long police can protract a stop to perform a legitimate investigation, 
but Professor Katz shows that the problem of defining “investigation” arises even 
before the stop begins. 
Ultimately, the heart of the “standard model” critique, as deftly wrought by 
Professor Katz, is that Warren never really told us when the stop occurred or 
acknowledged that the possibility that what might otherwise strike a person as an 
innocuous request sounds very different when it comes from a police officer. If 
Warren meant that no stop occurred before McFadden laid hands on Terry and 
spun him around, then Professor Katz’s reaction is, “Only an ostrich could reach 
that conclusion.”27 But, the consequence of that conclusion is that Warren never 
has to decide what level of suspicion might permit an officer to do what 
 
22.  Katz, supra note 11, at 439. 
23.  Id. at 439–40. 
24.  Id. at 446. 
25.  Id. 
26.  See infra Part E.i. 
27.  Katz, supra note 11, at 442. 
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McFadden clearly did earlier in the encounter, unless Warren meant that at that 
point the men would have felt perfectly free to leave. So, writing decades after 
Terry, Professor Katz observes, 
 
if the Court truly could not tell precisely when the seizure took 
place, that uncertainty demonstrates a complete lack of 
understanding of the relationship on the street between police 
and citizens, especially between police and black citizens. It is an 
understanding that the present Court totally lacks, but we had 
expected better of the Warren Court.28 
 
In the end, Professor Katz concludes, “What the Court, in fact, did was uphold a 
seizure on less than probable cause based on little more than race.”29 
In further elaboration of the “standard model,” Professor Katz traces the 
metastasis of Terry’s recklessly sloppy treatment of detentions into a variety of 
worrisome stop contexts in such cases as United States v. Mendenhall,30 INS v. 
Delgado,31 Florida v. Bostick,32 and United States v. Drayton.33 Finally, 
Professor Katz adds a very poignant exception-that-proves-the rule memoir of 
personal experience that illuminates the incredible assumptions the Court made 
in rationalizing searches and seizure in these contexts.34 
One more important feature of the “standard model” reassessment comes 
from Professor David Harris.35 Canvassing post-Terry cases in the lower courts 
on the specific issue of “particularized suspicion,” he finds something very 
surprising: What he calls the Court’s “rhetoric” about particularized suspicion 
has hardly changed since 1968, the lower courts having “gradually but 
unmistakably eroded the force of these words.”36 Professor Harris laments that 
courts, without saying so, have extracted from Terry virtually per se categories or 
 
28.  Id. at 442. 
29.  Id. at 451. 
30.  446 U.S. 544, 545 (1980) (holding that an arguably coercive stop was a consensual encounter). 
31.  466 U.S. 210 (1984) (during government sweep of factory for possible immigration violators, words 
of “request” for identification do not amount to “demand” and thus no seizure occurred).  
32.  501 U.S. 429, 430 (1991) (holding that police questioning of passengers sitting in Greyhound bus 
during a brief scheduled stop does not necessarily amount to a seizure simply because person did not feel free to 
leave out of fear of benign being stranded when bus imminently left). 
33.  536 U.S. 194, 195 (2002) (similarly to Bostick, holding that situation of passenger confronted on bus 
did not vitiate consent to search his bag). 
34.  In 1969 Professor Katz was already a law professor and a Naval reserve officer when, traveling on a 
Greyhound bus, he was approached by a federal agent who demanded to see his identification and draft card, 
presumably checking on possible draft evaders. Professor Katz refused to comply, leaving the agent angry but 
helpless, but he knew then that most people so confronted would not have the legal knowledge and confidence 
to stand by their rights. And he asks us to recognize that if we transpose his story to the modern cases of young 
men of color on urban streets or on commercial buses, most individuals would feel compelled to acquiesce to 
the police. Katz, supra note 11, at 484. 
35.  David A. Harris, Terry and the Fourth Amendment: Particularized Suspicion, Categorical 
Judgments: Supreme Court Rhetoric Versus Lower Court Reality under Terry v. Ohio, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 
975 (1998). 
36.  Id. at 976. 
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contexts where facts that are perhaps at most indicia of suspicious behavior 
become conclusive proof—e.g., being in a “high crime area” or exhibiting a 
desire to avoid the police. Thus, while sometimes paying rhetorical fealty to the 
idea that certain facts are just factors in an overall weighing of reasonable 
suspicion, lower courts have slowly and steadily created categories of cases 
which allow police to frisk after a stop, whatever the specific facts are.37 In 
Professor Harris’s view, they have done this by making general declarations that 
crimes that police may plausibly regard as dangerous and hence friskable people 
whom they suspect of crimes that do not necessary involve weapons. Thus, under 
these cases, a frisk is automatic upon any legitimate stop that falls into one of the 
“always frisk” categories. In effect, the courts have treated the Harlan 
concurrence as the operative law, even though, Professor Harris insists, Harlan 
was disagreeing and not clarifying Warren on this point.38 For Professor Harris, 
unless the Supreme Court corrects this problem, Terry will lose its legitimacy, 
and become, in practical terms, a decision which legally permits a stop and a 
frisk of almost anyone, for almost any reason.39 
B. Counter-Standard Models 
While the highly critical Katz and Harris reassessments surely represent the 
majority tone of this art form of scholarship, there are reassessments that take a 
positive position, although these counter-standard models are very heterogenous. 
Perhaps the most striking is the refreshingly, if jarringly, provocative view of 
Professor Akhil Amar.40 And, a distinctive feature of his reassessment is its 
balance of fervent praise with Terry with harsh criticism. Professor Amar’s 
strategy is to speak of the good Terry and the bad Terry. 
Professor Amar’s good Terry is very good indeed. In his endorsement of the 
Warren opinion, he says that by affirming the legality of seizures and searches 
that lack warrant and probable cause, Terry affirmed what he (Professor Amar) 
has long argued is the correct foundational view of the Fourth Amendment as 
expressed in its very textual language. The only textually mandatory rule for 
searches and seizures is that they be “reasonable.”41 The Framers phrased the 
warrant and probable cause rules the way they did—warrants require probable 
cause and particularity, but searches and seizures do not require warrants—
because, in the English regime we inherited, warrants were the problem, not the 
solution. In a feint toward criticism, Professor Amar acknowledges that Chief 
Justice Warren “must bear some of the blame for the current confusion”42 
 
37.  Id. 
38.  Id.  
39.  Id. at 977. 
40.  Akhil Reed Amar, Terry and Fourth Amendment First Principles, 73 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1097 
(1998). 
41.  Id. at 1098–99. 
42.  Id. at 1097. 
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because the opinion does not make this magisterial principle clear enough. So 
writing on the 30th anniversary, Professor Amar announces that the time has 
come to eschew the confusing and contradictory language that Warren had taken 
from earlier cases, and indeed he is reassured that some post-Terry cases clarify 
what he believes Warren surely and laudably meant all along.43 
There is a premise of the good Terry that leads us to understand Professor 
Amar’s bad Terry. The good Terry takes a generously broad view of searches and 
seizures so that the Fourth Amendment could apply to “myriad ways in which 
government might intrude upon citizens’ persons, houses, papers, and effects.”44 
The bad Terry that emerges is that as we parse the details of the case we come to 
fear that the broad view was not broad enough. With the flexible standard of 
reasonableness, the Court should have been able to intervene even earlier in the 
encounter and not wait until what has become, in the Terry lore, the 
controversially late-in-the-narrative location of the seizure. Professor Amar 
laments, “Sustained and purposeful surveillance by the unaided eye, the bad 
Terry implied, is not a Fourth Amendment ‘search’ and thus, apparently, need 
not be reasonable.”45 So for Professor Amar the Fourth Amendment may have 
applied even when McFadden first engaged in his arguably authoritarian initial 
encounter with Terry. In effect, a hypothetical Justice Amar would have added 
his own concurring opinion to Justice Harlan’s. 
And, in a further twist, the flexibility of the pure reasonableness standard 
permits Professor Amar to diversify (or hedge) his agreements or disagreements 
with other perspectives. If law enforcement would resist early intervention of the 
Fourth Amendment because it might set too demanding a standard for a 
borderline-coercive encounter, then no problem: reasonableness allows us to 
calibrate or adjust the height of that bar in proportion to the degree of coercion.46 
And, Professor Amar has still more ways to adjust his distinctive reading of 
the Fourth Amendment to address or accommodate disparate views. He is well 
aware of the racially disparate effects of police discretion, and thus aware that his 
praise of the good Terry will provoke criticism that he fails to acknowledge the 
racial justice problem. But, he is confident, even Panglossianly so, that “the 
spacious concept of reasonableness allows us to look race square in the eye, 
constitutionally.”47 On the other hand, this “spacious concept” will also allow us 
to sensibly and flexibly implement the presumption that the Bill of Rights is 
designed to be counter-majoritarian by being “suitably responsive to popular 
sentiment.”48 Finally, Professor Amar concedes that it might be an aspect of the 
 
43.  Id. at 1125 (citing Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (upholding saucepan 
stops at police roadblock checkpoints as reasonable), and Veronia School District 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 
(1995) (upholding as reasonable random drug testing of high school athletes)). 
44.  Id. at 1098. 
45.  Id. at 1099. 
46.  Id. 
47.  Id. at 1098. 
48.  Id. at 1099. 
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bad Terry that Warren seems tragically disconsolate that the exclusionary rule is 
helpless in the face of common stop and frisk activity. But, to the rescue, the 
good Terry would turn this into a positive by taking the opportunity of the stop 
and frisk to remind us that, as Professor Amar has also long believed, the 
exclusionary rule has no constitutional basis in the first place.49 
Thus, the hypothetical Amar concurrence makes highly versatile use of the 
Terry case to accomplish all the goals his theory of the Fourth Amendment seeks 
to fulfill. 
A different kind of counter-standard assessment comes from Professor 
Stephen Saltzburg.50 The Amar assessment is theoretical, normative, even 
aspirational, with side reassurances that it could be implemented pragmatically. 
By contrast, Professor Saltzburg’s stays close to the pragmatic, confidently 
asserting that the core Terry holding was a sound doctrinal way of balancing the 
Fourth Amendment and public safety, while acknowledging that this proper 
balance needed some post-Terry years to become clear, and recommending one 
key refinement. Professor Saltzburg is confidently assertive at the start: 
 
My thesis is rather simple and straightforward. It has four prongs. 
First, Terry itself failed to provide a clear enough yard-stick for 
law enforcement, and without further elaboration by the Supreme 
Court, the doctrine might have become unworkable. Second, 
subsequent Supreme Court elaborations on Terry have developed 
a standard that is as clear as most Fourth Amendment standards 
can be and that is adequate to distinguish permissible from 
impermissible law enforcement confrontations with citizens, at 
least as far as stops are concerned. In fact, the results reached 
under Terry are practical, reasonable and defensible. They are 
practically as perfect as we are likely to get. Third, the extension 
of Terry to a number of different situations that are analogous to 
stops has been, for the most part, logical and defensible. Fourth, 
the aspect of Terry that is most problematic and that requires a 
more subtle approach than the Court has offered thus far is “the 
frisk.”51 
 
Perhaps the key here is that as compared to Professor Amar’s virtually 
celebratory explanation of the good Terry, Professor Saltzburg has very modest 
expectations for the ability of the Fourth Amendment to do all it is being asked to 
do in the highly fraught arena of police-citizen encounter. And, in his view, the 
Court’s performance in doing so is, well, not great, but at least defensible. 
 
49.  Id. at 1119. 
50.  Stephen A. Saltzburg, Terry v. Ohio: A Practically Perfect Doctrine, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 911 
(1998).  
51.  Id. at 911–12. 
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Professor Saltzburg observes with some respect, but considerable concern, 
that Warren limited his opinion to a deceptively narrow question, i.e., “[W]e have 
no occasion to canvass in detail the constitutional limitations upon the scope of a 
policeman’s power when he confronts a citizen without probable cause to arrest 
him.”52 In initial harmony with the standard model critique he laments that 
Warren’s opinion provides: 
 
virtually no guidance to either the police or the public as to what 
a police officer may do when confronting suspicious behavior. 
Notwithstanding the fact that Terry is widely known today as a 
reasonable suspicion case and as establishing a reasonable 
suspicion standard, one can find nothing in Chief Justice 
Warren’s opinion to support the claim that he thought that was 
the standard the Court was adopting.53 
 
Still Professor Saltzburg offers a more generous take on parts of the holding, 
including the gaps and ambiguities, arguing that the Court was quite aware of and 
sympathetic to the difficulties that law enforcement officers face when they are 
called upon to make split-second decisions: “The Chief Justice understood that 
Detective McFadden and others like him could not be present indefinitely in front 
of a single store, if they were to do their jobs, and they must sometimes act when 
criminal activity may be ‘afoot’ or lurking.”54 
But, in any event, Professor Saltzburg goes on to cite a series of cases that, in 
his view, cure any of Warren’s gaps or errors. Some of these are cases that many 
critics of Terry lament or even denounce because, the argument goes, they prove 
how dangerous Terry ultimately turned out to be. But, for Professor Saltzburg, 
the opposite is true: For him, they clarify that the true heart of the Terry doctrine 
is that a stop is to be based on “reasonable suspicion” that justifies an 
“investigatory stop” and entails a frisk. Thus, he positively notes Adams v. 
William,55 where the Court upheld reasonable suspicion based on an informant’s 
tip and no direct police observation. Professor Saltzburg praises the Court’s 
willingness to permit the officer to consider “the area in which the car was 
located, the time of the morning, the absence of any legitimate explanation for 
the car’s presence, and his familiarity with the tipster in deciding that he should 
intervene and confront the suspect.”56 And, Professor Saltzburg admires the 
Court for appreciating that “no police officer could be expected to approach a 
suspect who is supposed to be armed and who may be involved with narcotics 
 
52.  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16. See Saltzburg, supra note 50, at 920. 
53.  Id. at 926. Professor Saltzburg suggests that this gap in Warren’s opinion reflected his effort to deal 
with the different factual postures of the companion cases of Peters v. New York and Sibron v. New York, 392 
U.S. 40 (1968). 
54.  Saltzburg, supra note 50, at 927. 
55.  407 U.S. 143 (1972). 
56.  Saltzburg, supra note 50, at 944. 
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without checking for weapons.”57 In doing so, avers Professor Saltzburg, the 
Court confirmed that the Harlan concurrence’s “two-step” explanation of the 
majority opinion in Terry has become the operative law.58 
But Professor Saltzburg, one should note, does not praise Terry for 
necessarily favoring police; he praises it for getting the balance just right. Thus 
he approves of Almeida-Sanchez v. United States,59 where the Court held that 
roving near-the-border searches without probable cause were impermissible but 
where the Court took pains to refer to Terry and Adams in noting that the 
Government had not even tried to justify the searches on reasonable suspicion 
grounds. But, he also approves of United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,60 where the 
Court justified stopping cars near the border without probable cause if the police 
have Terry reasonable suspicion, but still put some teeth into that standard by 
rejecting a stop based solely on the driver’s supposedly ‘Mexican” appearance. 
Professor Saltzburg actually has a more mixed view of the application or 
extension of Terry into new contexts. He applauds the extension to seizures of 
property in such cases as United States v. VanLeeuwen,61 where, in his view, in 
allowing a temporary seizure of mail reasonably suspected to be contraband the 
Court solved a practical problem for the police parallel to the pedestrian street 
stop in Terry.62 On the other hand, and somewhat cursorily, Professor Saltzburg 
seems to disdain the application of Terry to some contexts usually placed under 
the umbrella term of “special needs” or balancing cases. He approves of New 
Jersey v. T.L.O.63 where the Court permitted searches without probable cause in 
public high schools so long as they met a Terry-style criterion of reasonableness 
in terms of a balance of the schools parens patriae duties and students’ privacy.64 
By contrast, he disapproves of Griffin v. Wisconsin,65 where Justice Scalia 
relieved the police of the probable cause requirement in the search of a 
probationer. As Professor Saltzburg notes aprovingly, the Court found the search 
sufficiently justified by the probation official’s direct experience with the 
probationer, the need to protect confidential sources, and the assumption that the 
probationer is in need of monitoring and rehabilitation because of his established 
criminal proclivity. And, in particular he says that the confidential source 
argument “sheds no light on whether a probable cause or reasonable suspicion 
standard”—the heart of Terry to which Professor Saltzburg is so devoted. “The 
rationale for a rule of necessity is not easily extended to justify rules of 
convenience.”66 Thus, while Professor Saltzburg sees some value in this species 
 
57.  Id. 
58.  Id. 
59.  413 U.S. 266 (1973). 
60.  422 U.S. 873 (1975).  
61.  397 U.S. 249 (1970).  
62.  Saltzburg, supra note 50, at 960. 
63.  469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985). 
64.  Saltzburg, supra note 50, at 971–72. 
65.  483 U.S. 868, 872–73 (1987). 
66.  Saltzburg, supra note 50, at 972–74. 
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of special context interest balancing, he would limit these extensions of Terry to 
situations where there is some distinct need for quick action—in which case 
Terry itself can apply. 
Finally, Professor Saltzburg has one enduring objection to the Warren 
opinion itself—although it still reflects his Terry loyalty because it involves the 
Harlan concurrence. Warren, of course, seemed to apply the reasonable suspicion 
standard with respect to the danger to the officer that justified a frisk. Harlan 
believed that the right or power to the frisk should be “immediate and automatic” 
if the stop is legitimate—at least if the suspicion is about a crime of violence.67 
And, Professor Saltzburg regrets that later courts have not heeded Harlan’s 
view.68 At the very least Professor Saltzburg wants to set a rule that gives a huge 
benefit of the doubt to the officer: 
 
Recognition of the automatic nature of the frisk is preferable 
than [sic] pretending that it is reasonable to individualize 
decisionmaking in these circumstances. When no officer can be 
reasonably certain that a person is not dangerous, and the 
circumstances—one on one contact, darkness, and the size of a 
suspect, for example—indicate that danger might be present, an 
officer should be able to make a frisk. An officer should not be 
denied the right to self-protection simply because the conditions 
surrounding the stop make it impossible to make a reasoned 
determination about danger.69 
 
But overall, Professor Saltzburg concludes, with perhaps just a touch of 
rhetorical wryness, that 
 
the Terry rule that I regard as practically perfect had clearly been 
established in 1979. . . . If the Supreme Court pays more careful 
attention to the arguments for permitting frisks or related self- 
protective measures in future cases, the Terry rule will become 
even more practically perfect than it presently is. The rule has 
stood the test of time, but with a little refinement, it promises to 
stand the test of the future.70 
 
The most strikingly original of the reassessments comes from Professor 
Susan Bandes.71 Her starting point is that Terry should be on her “hit list” of the 
worst Supreme Court cases she can imagine—cases so awful that the historical 
 
67.  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 33 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring).  
68.  E.g., Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979); Michigan v. Long, 63 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983).  
69.  Saltzbrug, supra note 50, at 968, 970. 
70.  Id. at 951, 974. 
71.  Susan Bandes, Terry v. Ohio in Hindsight: The Perils of Predicting the Past, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 
491 (1999). 
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counter-factual whereby they had never happened would carry clearly good 
consequences.72 But, about Terry she is not so sure. Despite its possibly merited 
place on the hit list, Terry has led Professor Bandes to conceive a new subgenre 
of reassessment—where a bad case must be compared not to a better different 
decision that could have been rendered on that occasion, but to the consequences 
of there being no decision at all on that occasion. In a remarkable 
interdisciplinary borrowing, she imagines how chaos theory might inform us in 
this inquiry: 
 
Chaos theory studies the behavior of dynamic systems, or 
systems that are not in constant equilibrium. It posits that in such 
systems, cause and effect are not linear or proportionate- instead, 
seemingly minor causal agents may lead to disproportionately 
major effects. The connection among forces in a system may 
even appear random, though over time more complex and subtle 
patterns may appear. But even these patterns will not be exactly 
duplicative because each recurrence takes place in a different 
environment. Moreover, individual systems do not exist in 
isolation, but are themselves part of a complex environment that 
is in a continual state of flux.73 
 
So, what would have occurred if Terry had never been decided? Professor 
Bandes notes that as Professor Wayne LaFave said at the time, the decision 
“[left] room for later movement in almost any direction.”74 For her, the question 
is especially difficult for an ambiguous case like Terry: Indeed, she finds the 
question not just difficult, but likely incoherent. Terry asks the question at the 
heart of criminal procedure: what is the proper balance between law enforcement 
and citizens’ privacy and autonomy? And, Professor Bandes bluntly states, 
“There can be no answer to this question that isn’t shaped by time, place, vantage 
point, and a host of interactive, evolving societal forces.”75 Perhaps police would 
have continued to stop and frisk suspects, mostly neighborhoods with poor 
people of color, with no formal legal restraint. But what would have been the 
secondary social and political effects? Would police departments respond by self-
regulating in a manner somewhat parallel to Terry? Would local and state 
governments have acted to fill the Supreme Court void? A few months after 
Terry, Richard Nixon was elected in part because he exploited—and even 
orchestrated—angry public reaction, sparked particularly by Miranda, to the 
Warren Court’s perceived favoring of criminals over police.76 To ask how 
 
72.  Id. at 491. 
73.  Id. at 492. 
74.  Wayne R. LaFave, “Street Encounters” and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters, and Beyond, 67 
MICH. L. REV. 40, 46 (1968).  
75.  Bandes, supra note 71, at 494. 
76.  Id. at 495–96. 
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national politics would have changed without Terry one would have to know 
what, if any, effect Terry had on the anti-Warren anger. Did it exacerbate it or 
assuage it? Would the non-declaration of the Terry holding led to more sympathy 
for or more fear of possible offenders? Would it have increased or decreased the 
usefulness of crime as a topic for political demagoguery? These are questions 
that call for highly sophisticated empirical political science and sociology—and 
they may even be too difficult for the expert practitioners of those disciplines. 
What about the courts themselves? Professor Bandes surmises that absent 
Terry, lower courts, lacking guidance, would have continued generating 
contradictory decisions that might have exacerbated uncertainty about all manner 
of Fourth Amendment matters, including probable cause and consent.77 
As for the Supreme Court itself, would it have gone on to more or less 
expansive definitions of probable cause and consent? Would it have shifted to the 
equal protection clause? As Professor Bandes nicely puts it, it is hard to say how 
the Court would have deployed its “finite amount of capital.”78 As she 
summarizes: 
 
Was Terry wrongly decided? Yes. It didn’t achieve what it set 
out to; it never faced the racial issues that have, if anything, 
worsened; and it arguably placed its imprimatur on an abusive 
set of practices. In the bargain it seriously damaged the structure 
of Fourth Amendment law, allowing for an ad hoc, unprincipled 
balancing whose costs go far beyond the excesses of stop and 
frisk. Would we have been better off without it? That depends.79 
 
III. THE CONTINUING PUZZLES OF TERRY 
Drawing on the diverse and conflicted history of reassessments of Terry, I 
now want to offer my own modest contribution to the art form—a kind of meta 
reassessment in which I try to extrapolate the elements and implication of the 
Terry legacy that make it such a haunting and troubled one for criminal justice. 
In doing so, I will consider several cases which by virtue of being from lower 
courts may soon disappear from scholarly attention, but which serve as 
diagnostic markers of Terry questions witch most surely will not disappear. 
A. Suspicion and Probability, Procedure and Substance 
Rarely discussed in all the commentary on Terry is that Ohio generally 
prohibited carrying of weapons, and this fact is important to the ambiguities of 
 
77.  Id. 
78.  Id. 
79.  Id. at 497. 
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the case.80 Granted that the case is rightly criticized for focusing on the frisk 
rather than the stop, we know that reasonable suspicion, at least in retrospect, was 
to be the standard for a stop. On the one hand, the very term “suspicion” in 
Warren’s reference to hunches about Terry’s “suspicious appearance” suggests 
that a general indication of malevolent intent might be the heart of the matter. On 
the other hand, if we think of reasonable suspicion as a “lesser included” standard 
under probable cause, then the suspicion must be of a crime and it is 
probabilistic. Whatever the probability percentage is, it is obviously lower for a 
stop than for an arrest. On the other hand, we now know from Terry that 
reasonable suspicion may be with respect to a crime on the verge of occurring—
that it is “afoot”—so if we bring the “afoot” factor unto contact with the 
probabilistic concept of reasonable suspicion, we might say that even while not 
knowing which store they were aiming at, McFadden could make a certain 
percentage probability assessment that some robbery would occur (or that 
someone might have attempted or, to take things farther, might arguably be on 
the verge of attempting a robbery). On the other hand, Warren’s statement of 
facts can also be read as allowing McFadden to seize Terry on the probabilistic 
assessment that he was carrying had already committed the crime of gun 
possession. And, alas, it can also be read as essentially acknowledging that in the 
streets of America, where police survey a terrain of human behavior giving off 
murky signs of possible antisocial conduct, we must recognize the power of the 
police to act on wizened intuition against possible “danger.” 
This question whether we should view reasonable suspicion as a quantitate 
subset of probable cause is important because over the decades the majority of 
pedestrian stops under Terry have involved reasonable suspicion of crimes 
involving drugs or guns, and perhaps most often the suspected is mere possession 
thereof.81 Thus, if one side of the equation changes—that is the legality or 
illegality of possession—then the Terry calculation might have to be altered—
and this is exactly what courts have only very recently begun to struggle with. 
And as a premise for these questions, we must stipulate to the necessary 
interaction of probable cause and reasonable suspicion. Some of the cases 
discussed below are about probable cause, some about reasonable suspicion, and 
some both. The point is that if reasonable suspicion is a step on a probability 
continuum, the changes in substantive criminal law will apply to booth—but in 
proportionate degrees. 
B. The Problem of Marijuana 
One obvious context for this issue is of course marijuana, because it has been 
 
80.  See the state court opinion in State v. Terry, 214 N.E.2d 114 (Oh. 1965). 
81.  For a through discussion of the commonest “reasonable suspicion” bases for stops, see generally 
David Rudovsky & David A. Harris, Terry Stops-and-Frisks: The Troubling Use of Common Sense in a World 
of Empirical Data, 79 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (2018). 
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increasingly legalized in the states in recent years (put aside the fact that 
marijuana possession remains a federal crime). How marijuana law reform 
affects the Fourth Amendment depends on the nature of reform and the degree 
and nature of “legalization.” Under particular new state laws, for example, is it 
just use for medical purposes that is permitted? Is marijuana possession 
decriminalized but still closely regulated? Is the legal immunity just for “personal 
consumption” and in small amounts? 
A major scholarly treatment of this question comes from Professor Alex 
Kreit,82 but here I will just note some exemplary cases. Consider State v. Senna.83 
Vermont law allows qualified registered patients to possess marijuana after going 
through an administrative process. The court ruled that this law did not preclude 
police from justifying probable cause of a crime solely on the basis of the smell 
of marijuana. On the other hand, the court made clear that it had no immediate 
occasion to consider whether Vermont’s recent decriminalization of small 
amounts of recreational marijuana would call for a different oncome.84 
But then consider the Massachusetts case of Commonwealth v. Cruz,85 where 
the police stopped Cruz for a traffic violation and then ordered him out of the car 
after detecting the odor of marijuana. The police ultimately found cocaine in the 
car, but Cruz moved to suppress the cocaine because the discovery traced back to 
the detection of marijuana. Cruz argued that because a recent state law 
decriminalized possession of less than one ounce of marijuana in Massachusetts, 
mere evidence or suspicion of marijuana did not give reasonable cause to believe 
a crime had occurred. The court agreed. While in theory the police could have 
been concerned with diving under the influence, in this case the officers did not 
conduct any field sobriety tests to determine if the driver was presently under the 
influence of marijuana. Because the state law, decriminalized possession of one 
ounce or less of marijuana, the court inferred the voters’ intent to be that 
possession of such amounts was to be solely a matter of civil regulation.86 
Therefore, the odor of burnt marijuana “coupled with the driver’s statement that 
he had been smoking earlier in the day” suggested that any marijuana that 
remained would be less than one ounce. 
Finally, the court found that although the state statute has no effect on the 
crimes of possession with intent to distribute or operating while under the 
influence of marijuana, “there was no probable cause to believe that any of those 
offenses were being committed.”87 Without probable cause to believe that the 
defendant or the driver was committing any criminal offense, the court 
concluded, the police were not justified in ordering the defendant out of the car. 
But the dissenting judge observed: 
 
82.  Alex Kreit, Marijuana Legalization and Pretextual Stops, 50 U.C. DAVIS L.J. 741 (2016).  
83.  79 A.3d 45 (Vt. 2013). 
84.  Id. at 49–51. 
85.  945 N.E.2d 899 (Mass. 2013). 
86.  Id. at 905. 
87.  Id. at 904. 
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Even though possession of a small amount of marijuana is now 
no longer criminal, it may serve as the basis for a reasonable 
suspicion that activities involving marijuana, that are indeed 
criminal, are underway. The essence of reasonable suspicion is 
that it justifies an inquiry that may result in establishing that no 
offense has occurred, or that one may have occurred, but there is 
insufficient evidence to proceed to probable cause. An inquiry 
that does not produce evidence that supports going further does 
not retroactively render unreasonable a suspicion that was 
reasonable at the time.88 
 
As Professor Kreit demonstrates, the degree to which courts have altered the 
calculus of probable cause for arrest or reasonable suspicion for Terry stops 
depends on the nature and degree of changes in particular state laws. The clearest 
distinction is between laws that only “decriminalize” and those that more fully 
“legalize.”89 Especially in that latter category, as he shows, the police will have 
few opportunities to stop people on minor offenses and then leverage stops into 
the possibility of finding true contraband or evidence of other crimes. So, cases 
like Cruz will therefore affect the utility to the police of the important doctrine of 
Whren v. United States,90 whereby so-called pretextual stops for minor offenses 
based on objective evidence of minor offenses are permissible even if the true 
intent of the police is to find evidence of something more serious for which they 
lack sufficient cause. Whren, in effect, was built on Terry. It is what Terry in a 
sense wrought, and we might ponder whether the effect on Terry of these 
changes in substantive criminal law will cause Whren to lose its salience without 
any need to overrule it. 
C. The Problem of Guns 
As compared the marijuana issue, supposedly safe assumptions about the 
permissibility of a stop under Terry have been upended even more by the 
application of the Fourth Amendment to gun possession, for at least two reasons: 
First, the “legalization” or “decriminalization” of gun possession has taken on its 
own constitutional force. Second, it is the gun which has exposed the continuing 
fault line created by Warren’s clumsy meme of “armed and dangerous” and the 
ambiguities it created in the relationship between danger and crime. 
Does the Fourth Amendment apply differently depending on the severity of 
gun regulation in a jurisdiction? Permits to carry concealed weapons are 
 
88.  Id. at 914–15. 
89.  Kreit, supra note 82, at 771. 
90.  517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). 
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notoriously hard to obtain in New York City,91 but so-called “shall issue” 
jurisdictions are very generous with concealed handgun possession, using a 
presumption of allowing concealed carry, subject to a few narrow exceptions. 
(There can of course be parallel variations in regard to the legality of long guns 
or open carry.) This issue taken on new salience since the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in District of Columbia v. Heller92, finding a right to individual gun 
ownership in the Second Amendment, and McDonald v. Chicago,93 applying that 
right to the states. The scope of these cases and possible legality of some gun 
control legislation are being worked out in many courts now,94 but only a few 
courts have addressed this question of the relationship of the Fourth Amendment 
and gun legislation. 
One decision from the Illinois Court of Appeals, People v. Penister, is 
usefully revealing.95The gist of the facts: Officer Whitlock and partner saw a car 
run a red light and ordered a stop. After the driver, Rockett, did so, the officers 
asked some questions and then asked Rockett and a passenger, Penister, to step 
out of the car. Whitlock opened the glove compartment and found a handgun, 
later the basis for a possession charge. In his suppression motion, Penister argued 
that his possession of a gun did not give Whitlock reason to believe he had 
committed any offense, because for all Whitlock knew, Penister might have had a 
valid FOID [Firearms Owners’ Identification] card (although he did not have 
one). The state argued Whitlock had probable cause to believe Penister was 
“engaged in an activity that requires a license,” and that Whitlock was allowed to 
wait until after the arrest to determine if the arrestee had the required license.96 
The court vehemently disagreed, mockingly saying that by the state’s logic, 
“any officer can wait outside any courtroom, arrest all persons who acted as 
attorneys, and find out after the arrests whether the persons had the requisite 
licenses to practice law” because unlicensed practice of law punishable as 
contempt, or that if “any officer sees a person driving a car, the officer has 
probable cause to arrest the driver, and the officer can find out later whether the 
arrested person has a license to drive.”97 The heart of the problem was that the 
police were acting on an “an outdated assumption” about the illegality of gun 
possession. What should Whitlock have done? In the court’s view, once he 
discovered the gun in the glove compartment, he should have tried to find out 
whether either man had a permit, and only if there turned out to be no permit, 
then arrest on probable cause. The court added that the short-cut taken by 
 
91.  See Rudovsky & Harris, supra note 81, at 535. 
92.  554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008). 
93.  561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010). 
94.  New York State Rifle & Pistol Association Inc. v. City of New York, 140 S. Ct. 1525 (2020) 
(holding that amendments to city’s handgun licensing scheme removing challenged prohibitions mooted 
plaintiffs’ claims). 
95.  People v. Penister, No. 1-15-1552, 2018 WL 3005912 (Ill. App. Ct. June 14, 2018). The court 
deemed the case “non precedential” and did not officially publish it.  
96.  Id. at 1–2. 
97.  Id. at 6. 
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Whitlock here was an example of the kind of police action all too rife with the 
potential for racial disparity. 
Consider another very revealing case. In Ubiles v. United States,98 the 
defendant attended the J’ouvert carnival, a festive and boisterous event, in the 
U.S. Virgin Islands. An unidentified man approached officers to report there was 
a young man in the crowd who had a gun in his possession; he described the 
man’s clothing and appearance but did not explain how he knew that the man had 
a gun, nor did he report anything unusual or suspicious about the man or his 
behavior. Officers then approached Ubiles. They later conceded that Ubiles 
exhibited no unusual or suspicious behavior when they approached him or when 
one officer began talking to him, nor, on approach, could they tell whether Ubiles 
was carrying any type of weapon. One officer nevertheless did a pat-down of 
Ubiles and found a loaded gun that later proved to be unregistered.99 
 The District Court denied the suppression motion, saying rather 
whimsically: 
 
It’s the night of—I think I can take judicial notice of—can be 
some heavy drinking. People are tired. So the kind of 
information that was given by the older gentleman . . . that he 
had just—pointing out the gentleman, describing the clothes that 
the defendant was wearing, had a gun, was enough reasonable 
suspicion for the law enforcement officers. . . to go over and 
question him in an investigative style. Prudent thing to do.100 
 
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the officers had no reason to 
believe that “a mere allegation that a suspect possesses a firearm, as dangerous as 
firearms may be, justify an officer in stopping a suspect absent the reasonable 
suspicion required by Terry.”101 Moreover, it noted, there was no general law 
forbidding possession in public, and while there are ways to possess a gun 
illegally in the Territory—such as by possessing an unlicensed gun or one with 
an altered serial number—the government did not offer any even rough statistical 
or probabilistic evidence about the frequency with which these gun illegalities 
happen. Thus, deploying the same proves-too-much rhetorical ploy as in 
Penister, the court averred: 
 
This situation is no different than if Lockhart had told the 
officers that Ubiles possessed a wallet, a perfectly legal act in the 
Virgin Islands, and the authorities had stopped him for this 
reason. Though a search of that wallet may have revealed 
 
98.  224 F.3d 213 (3d. Cir. 2000).  
99.  Id. at 214–15. 
100.  Id. at 215–16. 
101.  Id. at 218. 
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counterfeit bills— -the officers would have had no justification 
to stop Ubiles based merely on information that he possessed a 
wallet, and the seized bills would have to be suppressed.102 
 
Thus, if a New York City police officer has probable cause that a person is 
carrying a concealed weapon, the officer logically has very strong probable cause 
of a crime to justify a full search or an arrest, but the opposite may be true in a 
shall-issue place. 
D. “Armed and Dangerous” 
The gun issue brings us even deeper into the lingering uncertainties about 
Terry. Recall that in Terry the Court said the police might legitimately suspect 
that a person is “armed and dangerous,” raising the question whether that element 
is itself an alternate basis for a stop. Can police officers infer that someone they 
believe is armed is ipso facto dangerous enough to be stopped on that ground 
alone? To push things farther, what if the basis for the stop itself has nothing to 
do with guns—i.e., a traffic violation or a reasonable suspicion that a person on 
foot has just committed a theft—and the police infer the person is carrying a 
weapon. Does that inference justify a very forceful method of stopping the 
person?103 
Here is a recent case that raises that issue. United States v. Leo104 occurred in 
Wisconsin, which generally permits people who are 21 or older and not felons to 
obtain a concealed-carry license. The police relied on a tip about a possible 
burglary; the tip was made in good faith but later proved inaccurate. They seized 
Leo and his companion, Aranda, and because the tipster said Leo may have had a 
gun in his backpack—and because he was spotted near a preschool—they 
proceeded to pin him down and empty his backpack, never asking him any 
questions. Leo turned out to be a felon, and so he was prosecuted for the gun.105 
The government maintained that the search of the backpack was lawful 
because the officers had “reasonable suspicion” that justified stopping Leo and 
searching his backpack. The officer insisted, however, that the two suspects were 
not under arrest when Leo was pinned and Aranda handcuffed.106 Rather, one of 
the officers explained, he took these actions for safety reasons because, in his 
opinion, potential burglars and armed suspects always present “a possibility of 
violent action,” and unholstered guns also present a danger of accidental 
discharge—especially near a preschool. Another officer testified that he detained 
and handcuffed Leo to stop him “from reaching or grabbing the firearm.” 
 
102.  Id.  
103.  See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977) (holding that aggressive measures like 
ordering a stopped driver out of the car are legal if they serve officer safety). 
104.  792 F.3d 742 (7th Cir. 2015). 
105.  Id. at 744–45. 
106.  Id. at 745. 
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The government conceded that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest 
the men and thus could not search the backpack incident to arrest. And at the 
time of the search, the officers knew neither Leo’s age nor criminal history, nor 
did they inquire whether he had a license to carry a concealed firearm. But, the 
district judge ruled that the search had been authorized as part of an investigatory 
detention under Terry, and, despite the restraints on the men, they still posed a 
danger, for the somewhat illogical reason that they were not under arrest. 
Apparently, in the trial judge’s view, it was precisely because Leo had not yet 
been arrested that he might still regain control of the backpack.107 
The appellate court reversed, holding that at most the police had the power to 
frisk—but not to open—the backpack.108 It distinguished Michigan v. Long,109 a 
car stop case where the Court found that the driver had a lesser expectation of 
privacy, and where the roadside encounter was more “fraught with danger,” 
So let us consider yet another recent case, United States v. Robinson, one that 
probes farther into the so-called “armed and dangerous concept.110 The events 
happened in West Virginia, where, again, adults who are not felons can very 
easily get a firearm permit.111 An unidentified man called the police to say that he 
had just “witnessed a black male in a bluish greenish Toyota Camry load a 
firearm [and] conceal it in his pocket” while in the parking lot of a 7-Eleven, and 
that the Camry was being driven by a white woman and had “just left” the 
parking lot. The 7-Eleven was in an area with the highest crime rate in the city, 
especially for visible drug transactions. Indeed, when any local officer heard that 
a report from that location, “your radar goes up a notch.”112 The officers tailed 
the car, noticed that the two occupants were not wearing seatbelts, and made the 
stop. One officer asked the driver for her papers and asked the passenger to exit 
the car. Both complied, and an officer asked the passenger, Robinson, if he had 
any weapons on him. The officer later testified that instead of responding 
verbally, Robinson “gave [him] a weird look” or, more specifically, an “‘oh, 
crap’ look[].” The officer then frisked Robinson and recovered a gun, and 
Robinson was prosecuted for felon-in-possession.113 
Robinson moved to suppress the evidence recovered as a result of the frisk. 
He argued the police had no articulable facts demonstrating that he was 
dangerous because, as far as the officers knew, he might have had a legal permit 
to carry a concealed firearm. Robinson thus contended that the information that 
police received from the tip described seemingly innocent conduct and that his 
conduct at the time of the traffic stop also provided no basis for officers to 
 
107.  Id. at 746–47. 
108.  Id. at 749–51. 
109.  463 U.S. 1032 (1983). In Long, the Court allowed a search of the passenger comportment of a car 
upon a stop for mere reasonable suspicion—i.e., a search not justified as a search incident to arrest. In effect, it 
allowed that intrusion into the car to serve as a form of “frisk”. 
110.  846 F.3d 694 (4th Cir. 2017).  
111.  Id. at 698. 
112.  Id. at 696. 
113.  Id. at 697. 
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believe he was dangerous. In his view, as understood by the court, “Under the 
logic of the district court, in any state where carrying a firearm is a perfectly legal 
activity, every citizen could be dangerous, and subject to a Terry frisk and pat 
down.”114 
So, Robinson had no need to contest the district court’s conclusion that the 
police had reasonable suspicion to believe that he was armed. Rather, he argued 
that while the officers may well have had good reason to suspect that he was 
carrying a loaded concealed firearm, they lacked objective facts indicating that he 
was also dangerous so as to justify a frisk for weapons, since, as he read Terry, 
an officer must reasonably suspect that the person being frisked is both armed 
and dangerous. Moreover, he argued, his behavior during the stop did not create 
suspicion—”he was compliant, cooperative, [and] not displaying signs of 
nervousness.”115 
But, the court rejected Robinson’s claim and held that the “armed and 
dangerous” criterion for a Terry frisk was meant to unite the two terms, i.e., to be 
armed is to be dangerous. In the court’s view, Robinson confused the standard 
for making stops—which requires a reasonable suspicion that a crime or other 
infraction has been or is being committed—with the standard for conducting a 
frisk—which requires both a lawful investigatory stop and a reasonable suspicion 
that the person stopped is armed and dangerous. Thus, the court concluded, 
traffic stops of persons who are armed, whether legally or illegally, pose a great 
safety risk to police officers.116 
A concurring opinion at first seems to stake out a very different position, 
acknowledging Robinson’s predicate point that the power to frisk does not derive 
automatically from the power to stop.117 The concurring judge notes the view of 
other Circuits that the unitary interpretation “would allow law enforcement 
officers to frisk a wide swath of lawfully stopped individuals engaging in 
harmless activity. Indeed, by definition, an individual is armed” if he is 
“[e]quipped with a weapon. Armed, Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009).” The 
concurring judge goes on to elaborate the arguably absurd consequences of the 
unitary interpretation.118 Nevertheless, this gap between the majority and 
concurrence turned out to be splitting hairs once the concurrence made clear that, 
in its view, “armed” and “dangerous” are in theory separate but in fact usually 
united because the suspected weapon is a gun.119 So the concurrence concluded 
that while “treating individuals armed with firearms—lawfully or unlawfully—as 
categorically dangerous places special burdens on such individuals . . ., we 
recognize one such burden: individuals who carry firearms elect to subject 
themselves to being frisked when lawfully stopped by law enforcement 
 
114.  Id. at 696. 
115.  Id. at 698. 
116.  Id. at 701–02.  
117.  Id. at 703 (Wynn, J., concurring). 
118.  Id. 
119.  Id. at 705. 
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officers.120 
The vigorous dissent in this case is perhaps the most telling opinion of all in 
this recent suite of decisions. The gist of the dissent is that while guns are 
inherently dangerous, when a state legislature has decided that civilians can be 
trusted to be safe in carrying firearms on foot and in cars, the police should not 
be able to contravene that trust by inferring danger from the fact or suspicion of 
gun possession.121 Thus, the police could not reasonably point to danger where, 
as here (at least as the dissent reads the facts),122 none of the conduct reported in 
the anonymous tip was illegal—nor was it even unusual or “out of place” where 
it occurred.123 
There are several ironies here. The political irony—but not a self-
contradiction—is that a judge clearly inclined to the liberal side on Fourth 
Amendment issues finds it useful to proclaim Second Amendment principles. 
Indeed, the dissent stresses that without more “suspicious” facts, the police were 
simply seizing Robinson because he was exercising a constitutional right.124 
Another irony has to do with the officers’ citation of a “high-crime area.” The 
dissent flips this point with the deceivingly obvious—and tragically plausible—
sociological observation that the high crime area is often exactly where would 
find a high proportion of poor people of color.125 
The dissent then homes in on consequences of the court’s view: 
 
An armed citizen in an open-carry jurisdiction necessarily poses a 
“danger” to the police that justifies a protective frisk if and only if 
he appears to have committed some offense, however trivial—like 
the seatbelt violation here—leading to a valid stop. If, on the other 
hand, the police in this case had initiated a consensual encounter 
with Robinson in the 7-Eleven parking lot, then the gun Robinson 
was suspected of carrying would not have been grounds for a 
frisk, as the government conceded at oral argument. Likewise, 
had Robinson exited the car in which he was a passenger before 
the police could conduct their pretextual traffic stop, then again he 
would no longer be “dangerous” for purposes of allowing a Terry 
frisk, notwithstanding the concealed gun in his pocket.. . . [I]t is 
hard to see why an officer’s right to protect him or herself would 
be made to turn on whether a dangerous person carrying a gun has 
remembered to fasten his seatbelt.126 
 
 
120.  Id. at 706. 
121.  Id. at 707 (Harris, J. concurring). 
122.  Id. at 708. 
123.  Id. at 708–09. 
124.  Id. at 708. 
125.  Id. at 715. 
126.  Id. at 711 (emphasis in original). 
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Thus, one of the fault lines exposed by the dissent is that by the weird logic 
of treating stops for traffic offenses as Terry stops, the criterion of “suspicion” of 
“crime afoot” can be satisfied by a trivial traffic offense—or even a pedestrian’s 
jaywalking offense—where the statistical likelihood or plausible expectation of 
probable cause for an ultimate arrest might be nil. And, yes, the dissenting judge 
bumps against the Whren principle. But, the judge not only acknowledges this; 
she notes the perverse honesty of the officer in this case. He acknowledged that 
he looked for and took advantage of a trivial traffic offense in order to follow up 
on a very questionable anonymous tip that someone in the car was armed and 
dangerous.127 The judge’s very point is that this case demonstrates the brutality of 
Whren. 
E. What Is an Investigation? What Is an Arrest? 
1. A Question of Duration and Purpose 
Now let us return to the Leo case above to see an important further problem. 
One of the government’s arguments there was that the police officers acted on 
legitimate safety concerns because they “did not have authority to detain Leo 
indefinitely” and thus he might “be released in the parking lot of the preschool 
with a weapon in his backpack.” Leo had no problem agreeing that the officers 
could not hold him indefinitely on mere reasonable suspicion, and he leveraged 
this point in his favor. He argued that if the officers could not elevate their 
reasonable suspicion into probable cause during the investigatory stop, “the 
Fourth Amendment demands that he was free to leave and to take his belongings 
with him.”128 
The court strongly endorsed Leo’s position, stating that a Terry stop cannot 
continue indefinitely. A stop that is too prolonged becomes “a de facto arrest that 
must be based on probable cause.” As the court put it, there are three possible 
outcomes to a Terry stop: (1) the police can gather enough information to 
augment reasonable suspicion to probable cause; (2) their suspicions may 
become dispelled, and the suspect is released; or, (3) the suspicions of the police 
are not dispelled, yet the officers have not developed probable cause and so must 
release the suspect because the length of the stop is about to become 
unreasonable.129 
Here the police admitted they did not establish probable cause at the time of 
the search of the backpack; they could plausibly argue that their suspicions had 
not been dispelled; but they misconstrued Terry by reasoning that in that 
dilemma they could hold Leo longer. To the court, “But this step, no matter how 
convenient for the police, is not one that is authorized by Terry or any other 
 
127.  Id. at 709. 
128.  United States v. Leo, 792 F.3d 742, 751–52 (7th Cir. 2015). 
129.  Id. at 751.  
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precedent” (emphasis in original).130 And, perhaps most tellingly, the court points 
out that if the officers were concerned about the safety of the preschool’s 
occupants, “nothing prevented them from following Leo into the building after 
the investigatory stop to keep an eye on him in case he attempted any 
wrongdoing.”131 Clearly, that action would not have extended the seizure. 
So, the Leo case focuses our attention on a major fault line in post-Terry 
jurisprudence. If the legal measurement for duration of a stop derives from the 
“investigative” rationale that supposedly justifies Terry seizures in the first place, 
the Court has not been helpful in telling us just what “investigation” means. 
“Investigation” obviously has some common-sense and intuitive connotations, 
but they are not very helpful in developing an administrable legal definition. We 
could rest with the idea that if there is reasonable suspicion, the police can detain 
for as long as is reasonably necessary to investigate and leave it at that. As I will 
conclude below, the Court so far has probably has left it at that. But cases like 
Leo suggest we need more. 
For example, the Court could define investigation in more detail, although 
Warren’s admonition in Terry about the wide variety of police-citizen encounters 
makes that task seem daunting. Or, the Court might say that even very long 
detentions are legal so long as whatever means the police are using to investigate 
do not themselves require probable cause (i.e., a true search rather than a frisk). 
Or, the Court could just say there is a specified (estimated?) time limit on a 
detention regardless of the means of investigation. And, whichever approach the 
Court takes, there is the follow-up question of what happens when the detention 
goes on too long. Must a court then suppress whatever evidence comes from an 
investigative step that occurs after the expiration moment, even if that step would 
otherwise not require any reasonable or probable cause? 
It turns out recently the Court actually has given us some help on these 
issues. But, to see how requires a bit of a detour to—pun acknowledged—cars. 
 
2. The Car Analogy and Investigation 
Most of what the Court has said about the length of detention comes from the 
somewhat distinct area of car stops. The closest thing we get to a constitutional 
time measurement happens with an auto stop case, United States v. Sharpe,132 
and we get a ruling that 20 minutes is not too long. But, Sharpe was not a typical 
car stop case—that is, one for a traffic offense. Sharpe was about a drug 
intervention that happened to involve vehicles, and the officer who protracted the 
challenged detention of the vehicle did so to coordinate operations with another 
 
130.  Id. at 751–52 (The court noted that this legally baseless argument was also disingenuous, because 
the search was a last-ditch attempt to find evidence of a crime before the clock ran out on the detention. This 
was because the officer searched the backpack immediately, without even asking Leo to identify himself).  
131.  Id.  
132.  470 U.S. 675 (1985). 
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officer who needed some time to get there to participate in the investigation. 
About 20 minutes after the initial stop, the police had probable cause to arrest,133 
and the Court said that was legal because the circumstances excused the delay. 
But, in the usual case of a stop for a traffic offense, it is way beyond the 
expectation of the officer that she will arrest the driver. Yes, some traffic 
offenses are deemed “arrestable” by statute and some not.134 But, even if a traffic 
offense is theoretically arrestable, the police officer normally anticipates doing 
just a few ministerial things during the stop—examine license, registration, and 
insurance and perhaps ask the driver a few questions—and then write up a ticket. 
Yes, she may also take the “plain sense” opportunity to notice whether there is 
contraband immediately visible in the car or whether the driver exhibits signs of 
being drunk (in which case the officer might then perform a field sobriety test). 
But, most often, no such probable cause emerges, and the driver just drives off. 
The courts call these typical auto stops “detentions” because they usually do 
not lead to arrests. For this reason, in theory, the stop can be based on mere 
reasonable suspicion of a traffic offense, but that sounds odd because, say, with 
observed speeding or stop-sign running, why should the officer worry about 
“reasonable suspicion” when she surely has probable cause—indeed virtual 
certainty of the traffic offense? Perhaps the legal system has come to call these 
detentions because the administrative tasks the officer must perform serve as a 
useful proxy for our general notion of an “investigation”—and because these 
tasks just happen to take about the same time as the Sharpe standard. 
As for the auto detentions that do become arrests because probable cause of 
drug possession or DUI gets established, we get some insights from two 
important recent cases involving the odd confluence of dog sniffs and vehicle 
stops. Because of the dog sniffs, first note the background decision of United 
States v. Place,135 holding that in most circumstances the use of a police dog to 
sniff out possible contraband in a private container does not invade any 
expectation of privacy and so is not a Fourth Amendment event at all. Then, with 
Place as a predicate, we have Illinois v. Caballes,136 where the Court held that 
during the normal “investigatory” duration of a stop for a typical traffic offense, 
the use of a police dog to sniff for contraband is of no constitutional moment 
whatsoever because, thanks to Place, it does not add to the otherwise lawful 
detention any intervention subject to the Fourth Amendment. But in Rodriguez v. 
United States,137 police conducted the dog inquiry after the ministerial actions for 
the traffic offense were done. So, the Court suppressed the evidence from the 
 
133.  Id. at 677–79. 
134.  Compare Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001) (police can carry out all incidents of an 
arrest for a minor offense if it is “arrestable” under state law), with Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 171 (2008) 
(Fourth Amendment allows search incident to arrest if police have probable cause to believe the person has 
committed an act classified as a crime under state law even if state law does not authorize use of the arrest 
power for that offense). 
135.  462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983). 
136.  543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005). 
137.  575 U.S. 348, 356 (2015). 
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sniff because the sniff had resulted from an illegal detention—i.e., a seizure no 
longer needed to investigate the original “suspicion’ of the traffic offense, nor by 
any independent reasonable suspicion of a drug crime. 
But, in Caballes and Rodriguez, the Court’s job was made easier here 
because the bureaucratic protocol of doing the paperwork supplied the functional 
parameters of the detention. And, as noted, that paperwork just happens to take 
about the same time as, or perhaps just slightly longer than, the detention in 
Sharpe. So Caballes and Rodriguez leave unclear how we determine the 
legitimate length of a stop in other contexts. Maybe, the answer should be about a 
half hour under any circumstances. But, would the outcome in Sharpe have 
changed if, because of some logistical problems, it took the second officer 90 
minutes to get to the scene? Or, what if in a street stop of someone suspected of, 
say, a robbery, the police need to hold the suspect for 90 minutes while they wait 
for the victim to get to the scene to identify the suspect? Is the general 
proposition that a detention can be as long as it can reasonably take to conduct 
the specific form of investigation required by a specific crime or situation? If so, 
the logical extension is United States v. Montoya-de Hernandez,138 involving the 
detention of person suspected of drug smuggling. There, investigation was 
simply waiting out the time of the bodily function needed to pass a swallowed 
drug balloon—in that case, 16 hours. Maybe Montoya-de Hernandez can be 
cabined as an international brooder case. But, far more mundane cases—like 
Leo—remind us that the mystery of “investigation” has contributed to Terry’s 
troubling legacy. 
There is another way of reading Terry that might obviate these questions. 
Professor Saltzburg has described one function of a detention as “freezing the 
scene” until the police confirm or disconfirm the suspicious inference139 But, 
there are surely cases where freezing the scene may be a kind of fake 
investigation whereby the detention serves solely to thwart potential criminal 
activity or scare off “suspicious” looking people. Perhaps, this is a laudable goal, 
but it is not one associated with the principles of the Fourth Amendment. At most 
it is a goal reluctantly acknowledged but not really embraced by Warren in Terry. 
This is the context in which the police may have neither expected nor desired to 
seize evidence, and so we recur to the tragic conclusion in Terry that that 
exclusionary rule is useless. 
Finally, what is the legal significance of a finding that a detention went on 
too long? Rodriguez gives us one answer. But, a simple and more general answer 
is that the seizure has become an arrest, and then, as noted, a court might reject 
an un-Mirandized confession or a search-incident-to arrest. But, if so, perhaps we 
all should have been addressing this question from the opposite direction. 
Perhaps, we should work on defining an arrest. Alas, that question turns out to 
remain surprisingly unresolved to this day. 
 
138.  473 U.S. 531, 544 (1985). 
139.  Saltzburg, supra note 50, at 952. 
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3. So, What Is an Arrest? 
In 2003 Professor Thomas Clancy wrote an important article140 decrying a 
remarkable confusion in American law: We do not know exactly what an arrest 
is. Yes, we know someone has been arrested if she is hauled off to the station 
house to be booked. We can also safely say a person has been arrested if the 
police say to her, “You are under arrest.” But, the vagaries of police-citizen 
encounters are such that that there are endless factual variations of seizures where 
the Fourth Amendment does and should identify an arrest—not just a detention—
but where those two no-brainer factors are not present. These are cases in which 
we must make the determination of arrest early on without benefit of later facts. 
If the police are at the borderline between a Terry stop and an arrest, we have to 
know whether the latter has happened to answer any of three legal questions: 
First, must there be Miranda wanting before questioning, because we have 
“custody” (which has come to mean the same thing as an arrest)? Second, can we 
have a search beyond a frisk—the search incident to arrest. Third, do we need 
probable cause? 
And, here is the problem Terry has left us. Had there been no such thing as 
Fourth Amendment regulation of that in-between species of a seizure called a 
stop, perhaps the Supreme Court would have given us a better definition of 
arrest. With the great variety of seizures now called stops under Terry, many 
lying along a subtle continuum of interventions into personal autonomy, we are 
often in a gray area where we just do not know for sure whether the incidents and 
requirements of arrest obtain. From the vantage of either the suspect or the 
officer or both, we face difficult questions: Do we just know that the detention 
has become an arrest because the time for investigation has expired? Too often 
we hear a definition of an arrest along the lines of “if a reasonable person would 
not feel free to leave,” but such verbiage is useless because it really defines a 
seizure and so does not tell us whether the seizure is a detention or an arrest. 
Yes, the Supreme Court could offer help, but so far it has been feckless, as is 
evident in its most recent approach to the question. In J.D.B. v. North 
Carolina,141 a youth was summoned to an administrator’s office in his school to 
be questioned about a crime. He was not given the Miranda warnings before the 
questioning that led to inculpatory statements, but the state argued that he was 
not in custody, i.e., had not been arrested, so no warning was needed.142 The 
decision in the case is annoyingly oblique. It is not about the particular 
vulnerabilities of a youth to questioning or whether a higher standard should 
apply to youth in determining a waiver of Fifth Amendment rights, or whether a 
quasi-Miranda warning rule should apply for youth who are seized but not in 
custody. Instead the Court punts to the lower courts the question of whether the 
 
140.  Thomas K. Clancy, What Constitutes an Arrest within the Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 48 
VILL. L. REV. 129 (2003). 
141.  564 U.S. 261, 265–66 (2011). 
142.  Id. See Berkemer v. McCcarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984). 
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defendant was indeed in custody, all the decision accomplished was to add that 
his youth should be one of several relevant factors in that determination. 
What were those factors? We are told that in general they are such things as 
the language or tone used by the police in addressing the suspect; the physical 
surroundings or location of the questioning; the duration of the interview; the 
extent to which the defendant is confronted with evidence of guilt; and, whether 
the officers brandished weapons or touched the suspect.143 
One might find this enumeration a description of types of facts that might be 
noteworthy under a very general standard. But, one might prefer that for a 
question of this import there be a nice bright rule. Better still, one might wish that 
the Court had realized that some items on this list so overlap with many types of 
facts that are consistent with a mere stop that they only confound all these Terry 
questions. In the end, the decision rule comes close to tautology. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In his brilliant review of the ways arrest has been defined, Processor Clancy 
recounts every definition derived from the common law, state statutes, and state 
constitutions, along with the vague adumbrations of the issue from the Supreme 
Court. With a keen critical eye he knocks most of them down as obsolete, 
anachronistic, tautological, vague, or unadministrable.144 But, at the very end, he 
settles on one as at least a sensible or logical default—an arrest “is any seizure 
exceeding the permissible bounds of a stop.”145 If that definition seems to depend 
on a clear definition of these permissible bounds, it may seem doctrinally naïve. 
But Professor Clancy is not naïve. He is wise, because he knows that because of 
the vexing legacy that Terry has left us, it may be the best we can do. 
 
 
143.  J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 286.  
144.  See generally Clancy, supra note 143, at 129. 
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